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Increasing returns are as fundamental a cause of international trade as
comparative advantage, but their role has until recently been neglected because
of the problem of modelling market structure. Recently substantial theoretical
progress has been made using three different approaches. These are the
Marshalliari approach, where economies of scale are assumed external to firms; the
Chainberlinian approach, where imperfect competition takes the relatively
tractable form of monopolistic competitition; and the Cournot approach of
noncooperative uantity.-setting firms. This paper surveys the basic concepts and
results of each approach. It shows that some basic insights are not too
sensitive to the particular model of market structure. Although much remains to
be done, we have made more progress toward a general analysis of increasing





Cambridge, NP 02139Since thebeciinni nqs of anal ytical economics the concept of
comparative advantage lias beer the starting point for virtual 1 y all
theoreti cal di scLssi on of international trade. The reasons are not
hardto find. Comparative advantage is a marvelous insight: simple yet
pro-found, indisputaole yetstill(more than ever'?) misunderstood by
most people, lending itself both to theoretical elaboration and
practical policy analysis. Whatinternational economi st, I ndinq
himself in yet another confused debate about US. 'competitivenes&',
hasnot wonderedwhether anythingusefulhasbeen said Since Ri cardo?
Yet ithaslong been clear that comparative advantage ——whichI
will here interpret loosely to mean a view that countries trade in
order to take advantage oftheirdifferences ——is not the only
possible explanation of international specialization and exchane. s
Ricardo doubtless knew, and as modern theorists-fromOhlinon have
reemphas]2ed,countries may also trade because there are inherent
advantages in EpEca1izaton, arising -from te existence of economies
of scale. t a logical level a theory o-f trade based on increasinq
returns ic as fundamental as one based on comparative advantage; at a.
practi cal level it is reasonable to argue that economies of scale, if
perhaps not as irriportant as national differences as a motive for
trade, are at least of the same order c-f magnitude.increasing returns as an explanation of trade has, however, until
recently received only a tiny -fraction ofthetheoretical attention
lavishedon comparative advantace. AQai n, the reasons are not hard to
+i nd. Where the concept c-f trade based on comparative advantage has
opened up broad avenues 0+ research the attempt to formalize trade
based or ncreasi ng roturns until recently seemed to lead to an
impenetrable iunçile c-f complexity. Economics understandably and
inevitablyfollows theline of least mathematical resistance, and so
until about tenyearsacm the role of scale economics was at best a
point to be mentioned in passin in most discussions o-f international
trade.
During the last decade, however • several paths have been -found
through the wilderness. The new literature on increasing returns and
trade does not yet have the generality and unity o-f traditional trade
theory, and it may never be tied up in quite as neat a package. We
can, however, row provide a -far more systematic account of the role of
increasing returns in international tradeand o-F the way this role
interacts with that o-f cornparatl ye advantage —— than would have seemed
possible not long ago. The purpose of this paper is to review the new
concepts that have made this progress possible.
The central problem in theoretical analysis of economics c-f scale
has always, o-f course, been the problem of market structure.
Unexhausted scale ecoriomi es are nconi stent with the standard
competitive model the problem of i ntroduci rig them into trade tneoryis thus one of finding departures from that model which are both
capable of accommodatinq increasing returns and tractable. Progress in
recent years has been based on three such departures, and this paper
dealswith each type ofmarket structure in turn.
Thefirst departure from the standard competitive model is the
oldest. This is the Niarshallian approach, in which increasing returns
are assumed to be whollyexternalto the firm, allowing perfect
competitiontoremain. Marshallian analyses of increasing returns and
tradego back to the early postwar period. The early literature on the
Marshallianapproach, however, seemed discouraging in thateven with
the simplest assumptions itseemedto lead to a welter of multiple
equilibria.. Only in the last few years has it become clear that under
certain circumstances it is possible to bring order to this
complexity.
The second departure is a more recent creation. Less than ten
years ago, several trade theorists independently applied formal models
of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition to trade. The Chamberlinian
approach hasproved extremely fruitful,providing a simple toolfor
thinking about avariety ofissuesin international economics.
Finally,the Cournot approach to oligopoly has begunto be widely
usedininternational trade theory. Much of this use is in normative
analysesof trade policy, which are not the subject of this paperw bUt
some positive analysis of trade has also been based on this approach.4
Theplan of this paper, then is to discuss in succession recent
developments in trade theory based on Marshallian.1 Chamberlinian, and
Cournot approaches to the problem of market structure. A final section
concludes wit.h some issues For futureresearch
Thelimitations o-F the papershouldbe made ci ear at the outset.
The work di scussedhereis theoretical workaimedat understanding the
causes and effects o-f trade, rather than at providinq quidance to
tradep01 icy That is,I amconcerned here with why trade happens and
what difference itmal<es,notwithwhat we should do about it.
Allowing for the importance ofimperfect competition may have major
implicationsfar the analysis of tradepolicy aswell, but I leave
discussion of these implications to the companion paper by Avinash
Dixit.. AlSOq no attempt is made to discuss empirical work, which has
in any case so far beer quite scarce in this area.
I.TheMarshallian Approach
In a sense the Marshallian approach to the analysis of trade
underincreasinq returns goesbackto Frank Graharnsfamous argument
-forprotection (r-aham 1923). Explicit general—epuilibrium analysis o-f
tradein the presence o-Fexternal economies beganwith Matthews(1949)
andwas continued in anumber cf papers. including Kemp and
Neqishi (1970) ,Neivin (1969), Chacholiades(1978),andPanaqariya(1981). For themostpart, however, this literature was not
successful in brinQinq increasinq returns into trade theory in away
which seemed to qenerate useful insiQhts or attract additional
research. Inparticular,theliteraturedid notseem tool-fer the
possibi 1 1 tyof a fruitfulmarri apeofincreasi nq returnsand
comparativeadvantaps as explanations of trade. Ironically, this
failure may have been in part because of an excessive loyalty to the
techniqes o-f conventional models —— production possibilitycurves,
offercurves, and so on.. As itturnsout, itis possible to have
modelsin which comparative advantage andtiarshallianexternal
Economiesinteract in a clear way, but the development of such models
depends crucially on the introduction ofnew techniques.
The key innovation herewasthe workofEthier(1979,1982a), who
showed that the analysis oftradein the presence ofMarshallian
externaleconomies isgreatlyclarifiedif we work fromtheallocation
of resourcesto productionand traderatherthan the other way around..
Thismayseem likeaminor chanpe; butit leadsto a thorouh
revamping of moellnq strategy. As we will see, a synthesiso-f
Marshallian increasing returns and comparative advantape comes easily
only i-f we focus on factor prices and the factor content of trade
rather than ongoodsprices and goods trade.
In this section, then, we will focus on the new version o-f the
Marshal ii ar approach • di stinui shed from the Older approach by tneway
.t works +rom resource allocation to trade. In addition to its direct6
usefulness,we will see that this approach provides us with techniques
and insights which are directly relevant to the Chamberlinian approach
as well
A. Thesi3estmodel
Thereis a family resemblance between the simplest model of trade
based on increasing returns and the basic Ricardian models In both
cases a fundamental principle of international trade can be derived
-Fromstudyingan imaQinary world of two countries two Qoods, and one
factorof product Ion.I-f the increasing returns modelhas nothad
anythinglike thesame influence,itis because there seem to be too
many thinQs that can happen. The task of the theorist is to find
restrictions which narrow the set of possibilities in an interesting
way.
Suppose, then, following the formulation of Ethier(1982a) ,that
the world consists o-ftwo countries, each with only one factor of
production,labor. To strip the problem down to bare essentials, we
assume that the two countries possess identical technology with which
toproduce two goods. One of these goods, call it Chips, is produced
atconstant returns at the level of the firm butis subject to
positiveexternal economies, so that at the level of the industry
there ar-s increasing returns. These external economies are assumed to
be country—spscific it is eachcountry's.domestic industry ratrier7
than the world industry as a whole that is subject to increasing
returns. The other good, call it Fish, is produced at constant returns
to scale at the level of both the firm and the industry. We will
assume that both Fish and Chips can be traded costlessly.
Now it is immediately apparent that even though both countries
start with the sametechnologicalpossibilities1 the e>istence of
economies of scale makes it inevitable that there will be
international specialization. To see this, suppose that both countries
were to produce both goods. The fact that both were producing Fish
would imply equal wage rates. But this would mean that whichever
country had the larger Chips industry woLdd have lower cost in that
industry; this would presumably lead that industry's relative size to
increase still further, reinforcing the cost advantage; and we will
have a cumulative process of differentiation between the countries
which continues until at least one of the countries has specialized.
nd as long as one country has specialized, we will have international
trade. So the model tells usthatincreasing returns will, as
expected, lead to specialization and trade.
The problem, of course, is that while the outcome must involve
specialization and trade, this still allows a numbero-f possible
equilibria. A little thought willsuggest that there are three
different kinds of equilibrium which can resL(lt. First, one country
might producebothChips and Fish while the other produces only Fish.
Second, both countries mightspecialize,one in Chips and one in Fish.B
Third,one country might specialize in Chips while the other produces
both qoods. Since it is also possible that either country may take on
either role, we seem to have as many as six possible equilibria even
in this simplest model.
Tosort outthiscomplexity, it is usefultobegin by noticing
thatourfirst kind of equilibrium,where both countries produce Fish,
isquite different from the other two in its implications for factor
prices and welfare. s long as both countries end up producing the
constant returns good, they will have equal waqes, something which
will not he truein the other typesof equilibrium. Since the
countrieswill have equal wages, it does not matter to their welfare
inwhich country the good is produced. Suppose that we could assure
ourselves that the international eauilibrium was in fact going to be
o-fthistype, where common production of a constant returns good
ensures equal wage rates. Then we miqht still have two equilibria, in
that either country could produce Chips, but these equilibria would
have a qood deal in common. In each the world outputofChips would be
concentrated ina single country;and the volume both o-fthat output
and the world output ofFish would be the same across the two
equilibria.Further, welfare, not only for the world asa whole but
for each individual, would be the same regardless o-F whichcountry
endsup with the Chips industry. Thus the indeterminacy of the model,
while not eliminated, would be sharply circumscribed.9
Welfare in this case does not depend on which country produces
Chips; how does it compare with autarky? A further appealing feature
of the equal—wace equilibrium is that it yields a very simple
condition for gains from trade. This is that each country gains -from
trade provided thatthe scaleof th or1d Chips industry after trade
is iarqer than the scale of thenationalindustrybefore trade. The
reasonis that this implies a lower unit labor cost and therefore a
lower price in terms of the (common) wage rate. The important points
to notice about this crtierion are, first, that it does not dependon
which country actually produces Chips, and, second, that it is avery
mild condition, likely to be satisfied. Thus we have in a quitesimple
way captured the idea that it is to everyone's advantage to be part of
a larger market.
The relative simplicity o-f the analysis whenwaqe rates are
equalized might lead ustoask whether there is some common ground
between this case and the case of factor price equalization in the
Heckscher-—Qhlin model. ifl -fact there is a common aspect, pinpointed in
Helprnan arid Krugrnan (19E). In both the Heckscher—Ohlir, and external
economy models, factor price equalization is a symptom of a deeper
aspect of the trading equilibrium, namely that "trade reproduces the
integrated economy- Ely ths we mean thatthe output and resource
allocationof the worldeconomy as a whole are the sameasthey would
havebeen if all factors of production had been located in a single
country. Or to putitanother way,th equalization of factorprices10
occurswhen the fact that the worlds productive factors are
geographically dispersed turns outnotto matter.
Once we realize that wage equalization amounts to saying that the
inteqrated economy is reproduced, a technique for analyzing the
prospects for waoe equalization readily follows Firstq construct the
jnterated economy—— i.e.from tastes, technolony, and-factor
endowmentscalculate what the allocation of labor between the Fish and
Chips industries would have been if labor had been able to move freely
between the two countries. Now in order to reproduce the interated
economy, the trading world must be able to achieve the same scale of
Chips production. Since external economies are assumed to be country—
specific, this means that the world Chips industry of the integrated
economy must now fit into one of the national economies with some room
to spare.
The implications of this condition are illustrated in Figures 1
and 2. In each diagram the line 00* represents the world endowment of
labor. The division of that endowment between the two countries can be
represented by a point on that line. Also, in each figure the distance
O0=Q'O* represents the labor -force devoted to Chips production in the
integratedeconomy.The di-f-ference between the figures isthatin
Figure 1 the Chips industry is assumedto employ less thanhalfthe
world's labor -force, while in Figure 2 it is assumedtoemploy more
than half.11
It isnowstraightforward to see what isnecessaryto allow
reproduction of the integrated economy. In Fiqure 1, splitting the
world to the left of C! allows the Chips industry to fit into Foreign
at intectrated economy scale; splitting it betweenC! and 0' allows it
tofitintoeither; splitting it to the right of C!' allows it to fit
intoHome. Thus there is al waystradi nq equilibrium in which wages
areequalized. In Figure 2, if the two countries are too nearly equal
in size ——the endowmentlies in0'Q —— theinteqrated equilibrium
cannotbe reproduced, but otherwiseit can.
What this analysis shows is that an equal—wage equilibrium in
which both countries produce Fish is not something which is unlikely
toexist. Indeed, unless the share of the world labor force devoted to
Chipsexceeds one—half such an equilibrium alwaysexists, and even
thenit will frequently exist. Soconcentrating on the equal—wage case
doesnot mean focU'ssinq on a rare event.
Unfortunately,the fact that an equal wage equilibrium exists
need not mean that it is the only equilibrium. Suppose. -forexample,
that Foreign is substantially smaller than Home, so that the endowment
point in Figure 1 lies to the right of 0'.Then there is an equal—wage
equilibrium with the Chips industry concentrated in Home. but there
might also be an equilibrium in which Foreign specializes in Chips and
has higher wages. We can only rule this out if Figure 1 is the
relevant figure and the endowment division lies between C! and 0' —— in
effect, if the increasing returns sector is riot too large and the
countries are not too unequal in size.12
Anequal—wage equilibrium in which trade reproduces the
integrated economy, then, is not the only possible outcome even in
this simplest model. It is however a plausible outcome and one which
yields appealingly simple results. Ihus there is some iustification
for stressing this sort of outcome. Further, the idea of reproducing
thei ntegratf?d economythroughtradeprovides a natural way to
integratetheanalysis o-f scale economies with that of comparative
advantage, as we will see shortly.
Before we proceed to the next section, however, we need to ask
what has happened to the traditional argument that increasing returns
sectorsare desirableproperty, and thatthe possibility that they
willcontract as a result of trade is a source o-f doubt about the
gains -from trade. The answer is of course that this argument depends
on the integrated economy not being reproduced, so that wages end up
unequal.Suppose that Figure 2 is the relevantdiagram, and that the
countrieshave equal labor forces. Then wages cannot be equal; wewi 1 1
clearlyhave onecountry which speciali:es in Chips and has a higher
wagethan theothercountry,which might lose from trade and in any
case will riot behappyabout the outcome.Onecan argueabout whether
this situation ismore or lessrealistic than an equal—wage
equ1lbrium;I would argue that it is less realistic,but the main
reason-For-focussing on thecase of -factorprice equalisation, here as
elsewhere,is o-fcourse that it is so much simpler to work with.13
B. Increasing Returns and Comparative dvantage
Themodel presented above is one in which increasing retursis
the only source of trade and gains from trade. This is ofcourse an
extreme and unrealistic case Just as is the Heckscher—Oh]inmodel in
Thic:h differences in relative factor endowmentsare theonlysource.
What we would like is a model in which both types of motiveare ab].e
to operate.
There is a considerable literature on whathappens in the 2x2
model when one sector is subject to increasing returns.Contributions
to that literature include in particularKemp and Negishi (1970),
Melvin(1969) and Fanaqariya(198).
Ourdi scussion of a one—factor model suggests, however, that 2x2
maynot be the most productive or even the easiest modelto study. The
simplifying devicwe found useful there was afocus on trading
equilibria which reproduce a hypothetical integratedeconomy. We also
notedthat factor price equali:ation in constant returnsmodels is
also equivalent toreproducing the integrated economy thorughtrade.
Thismakes itnaturaltolook for assumptionswhich allow reproduction
o-F an integrated economy when there are bothincreasingreturnsand
dif-ferences in ratona1 factor endowments.
Suppose that there are somegoods whichareproducedwith
country—specific external economies, and that there are others which
are produced with constant returns. Suppose also thattherearetwoor14
more factors ofproduction.Then a little thought will show that in
order to reproduct the integrated economy we must be able to do the
following: we must be able to distribute the integrated economys
industrialoutput among countries, usingthe integrated economy
techniesof44cc2fl, insucha way as to employ fully each
countrys factors of production; and when we do this each industry
subject to country—specificexternal economies must be concentrated in
a single country.
it is immediately apparent that weare very unlikely to be able
to distribute industries so as to fully employ all factors of
production in each country unless there at least asmany industries to
distributeas there are factors. Furthermore, increaing returns
sectors are not really "fungi bi e; because they must be concentrated
in a single country, they can be reallocated among countries only in a
discrete fashion. o to reproduce the integrated economy we basically
need to have as many constant—returns sectors as there are factors of
production. The minimal model with this property is 2x3: two factors
ofproduction and three goods, only one of them producedsubject to
increair,qreturns.
Imagine,then, that wehave a world in which there are at least
as manyconstant returns industries as there are factors, pius some
increasing returns industries, and that trade reproduces the
integratedeconomy. Then we n-f course have factor price equalization.
What else can we say about trade?15
Thefirst thing we can say isthattherewillbe specialization
dueto economies of scale: every increasing returns sector will be
concentrated in a single country. Thus even if every country hadthe
same factor endawment, there would still be specialization and trade
dueto scale economies. As in thecaseofthe one—factor model this
specializationwillin general have anarhitrr-y component:each
increasingreturns industry must be concentrated in a single country.
but hich country it is concentrated in may be indeterminate.
Despite this indeterminacy, in an average sense there will be a
relationship between factor endowments and the pattern of production
and trade. A country with a high relative endowment ofcapital must on
average produce a capital—intensive mix of goads, although it may
produce some relatively labor—intensive ones. I.e., the factor content
of a country 's production must match its factor endowment. On the
other hand, if countries spend their income in thesame way, all
countries will consume the same mix of goods, and thus thesame mix of
factor services embodies in those goods. It follows that countries
will be net e>porters of the services of factors in whichthey are
abundantly endowed, and thus that in an average sense the factor
proportions theory of trade will hold.
Thenext questi on is thatof gains from trade. Clearly there are
nowtwosources o-f potentialgainsfromtrade: specialization to take
advantage ofdifferences inrelative factor endowments and
specialization to achieve larger scale a-f production. The usual16
analysis o-f gains from trade, with its discussion of the enlargement
of each nation's consumption possibilities, does not carry over easily
into an increasing returns world where the pattern of production and
trade may well beindeterminate.Wehavejust argued however that
factor prices andthepattern of trade in factor services will still
be determinate if we havefactor priceequaiisation, so we might
suppose that the issueofgains from trade might also be resolvable if
we focus on factors rather than goods. And this is in fact the case.
What we can establish is the following: After trade a country
will be able to afford its pre—trade consumption provided that the
world scale of production of increasing returns goods is larger than
thatcountry snational scale of production before trade.(The scale
neednot be larger in allindustries; roughly whatis needed is that
on average worldindustries be larger thanpre—trade national
industrieswould havebeen. For an exactstatement see Helpman and
Kruqman(198)). Thus our criterion for gains from trade in the
simplest model has now become a sufficient —— notnecessary ——
condition for gains in a moreelaboratemodel. The reason it is only a
sufficient condition is, of course, that there are now additional
gains-from comparative advantage which will occur even ifscale ains
shouldsomehow -fail to materialize.
To understand this condition, consider a country which uses two
inputs, capital and labor. Let us firstimagine that all industries
operate under constant returns In Figure 3 we showtheunjt isoquant17
for some industry as II. The line A represents pre—trade factor
prices. Thus OX is the vector of pre—trade inputs per unit of the
good. Now suppose trade is opened, and that factor prices are
equalized across countries. Then the new -factor prices will be
different from be-Fore,sayTT. This change in factor prices is
I mrnediatel ya sourceof qai ns from trade. The reason is as foilows.
Before trade, the economy used OXto produce each unit of the good.
fter trade, however, the incomeo-F asmallervector of resources, DY,
isnow sufficientto buy oneunitof thegood. Since this must be true
forevery good, the economy can now earn enoLtqhto purchase its pre—
trade consumption and still haveresources to spare.
Supposenow that some goods are produced wi th economies o-f scale.
Provided that the scale of an industry after trade is larger thanin
the country before trade, the e-f+ect will, as in Figure4,be to shift
the unit isoquantinwards. This will add to thegains from trade. If
therewere no scale change,DYresources would be needed topurchasea
unitof the output; so OX—DY canbethought of asthecomparative
advantage component of the gainsfromtrade. Scale effects, however,
willgenerally shift the isoquant in (not necessarily for our country,
but-for the country where the good isproduced,which is all that
matters). The result will be to lower the resources needed topurchase
the goodstill-further, to OZ, so that QY—OZ can be thought o-f asthe
scale economy component of the gains from trade.18
Obviously if scale effects run the wrong way, so that isoquants
shift out, the effect will be to offset the comparative advantage
gains and perhaps produce losses from trade. However since the scale
comparisOfl15OflE?of flQ121 scalebefore trade with world scale
after trade there is a strong presumption that scale effects will
qenpral 1 y be a source of ai ns over and above those from comparative
advantage.
C. Theexternal con omypprpach: summa
Recent work has shown that whenthe Marshallian external economy
approach to increasing returns islookedat in the right way with the
rightassumptions, a clearand appealing story about trade emerges.
Theessential requirements to get this story are the willingness to
assume that a trading world reproduces the aggregate outcomes o-Fa
hypothetical perfectly integrated economy —— withfactor price
equalizationasoneof the consequences; anda willingnessto focus on
nettrade in factor services rather thanontrade in goods, which is
typically indeterminate. Given these concessions, we are able to
describe a world economy in which both factor proportions and scale
economiescontribute to international trade, and in which both are
sources of gains from trade. In particular:19
(i) ilthouch there is typically some indeterminacy in the precise
pattern of trade, in an yrage sense factor proportions theory
continues to hold. Countries will be net exporters of the services of
factors with which they are abundantly endowed.
(ii) At the same time, the tradinq economywillbe characterized by
qeographicalconcentration of each industry subject to country—
specific increasing returns. This concentration will be an independent
source of trade, and would require trade even if factor endowments
were identical
(iii) The opportunity to exchanqe factor services at prices different
from those which would prevail in the absence of trade will lead to
gains from trade for all countries.
(iv) These gains will be supplemented by additional qains if the
world scale 0-f production in increasing returns industries, wherever
they may be located, exceeds the national scale which would prevail in
the absence of trade.
11. The Chamberljnjan Approach20
The1970s were marked by substantial progress in the theoretical
modelling of imperfect competition. Among the approaches developed by
industrial organization theorists was a revival of Chamberlin's "large
ciroup" analysis of competition between similar firms producing
differentiated products. This analysis, once put in the form of fully
specified cieneral equilibriummodels,could be applied in a
straightforward way to international trade, where it has proved a
flexible tool of analysis.
The basic Chamberlinian idea is that one can think of at least
some industries as being characterized by a process of entry in which
new firms are able to differentiate their products from existing
firms. Each firm will then retain some monopoly power, i.e., will face
a downward sloping demand curve. Given economies of scale, however,
this is not inconsistent with a situation in which entry drives
economic profits t zero. ThUS Chamberlin's vision was of an industry
consisting of many little monopolists who have crowded the field
sufficiently to eliminate any monopoly profits.
The limitation which prevented much use of this approach in
international trade theory before the 1970s was the absence of any
rigorous treatment of the process of product differentiation. In the
70s. however two approaches to this problem were developed. The
first, identified with the work o-f Dixit and Stiglitz(1977) and
Spence(1976) imposed the assumption that each consumer has a taste
for many different varieties o-f a product. Product differentiation21
then simply takes the form of producinq a variety not yet being
produced. Thealternative approach, developed by Lancaster(1979) and
usedby Salop(198?), posited a primary demand not for varieties per se
butfor attributes ofvarieties, withconsLtmers dif+erinQ in their
preferred mix of attributes. Froduct differentiation in this case
takesthe Formof o++errq avarietywithattributesdi++erentfrom
those of already available.
For some purposes the differences between these approaches are
important. For international trade theory, however, it does not matter
muchwhich approachis used.Theimportant point is that both
approaches end with an equilibrium in which anumberof differentiated
products are produced by firms which possess monopoly power butearn
no monopoly profits. Thisisall we need to develop aremarkably
simple model o-finternationaltrade.
A.The Basic Model
Essentiallyvery similar Chamberlinian models of trade may be
found in papers by Dixit andNorman(1980),Ethier(1982b).
Helpman(!981),Kruqman(1979,1981), and Lancaster(1980). A synthesis
approach isiven in Helpinan and Krugman(1985). andI followthat
approachhere.
Considera world cortsistinq of two countries, Home and Foreiqn
endowed with two factors of production, capital and labor, and usingthe same technology to produce two goods, Food and Manufactures. Food
is simply a homogeneousproduct produced under constant returns to
scale. Manufactures, however, is a differentiated product, consisting
of many potential varieties, each produced under conditions of
increasinq returns. We assume that the specification of tastes and
technol oqy in tne Manufacturessectoris such that it ends L1being
monopolistically competitive; beyond this the details do not matter.
As in our analysis of the Marshallian approach, the trick in
analyzing this modelisto start by constructing areference point,
the integrated economy'.That is, given tastes and technology, we
findtheequilibrium of ahypothetical closedeconomy endowed with the
total world supplies of capital and labor. The key information we need
-From this calculation is the allocationof resources to each industry
andrelative factor prices. This information is shown in Figure 5.The
sides of the bo> the total world supplies of capital and
labor. The vector 00 =0*0' isthe allocation of resources to
Manufactures production in the integrated economy; 00* =0'Oisthe
allocation o-f resources to Food; the slope of WW is relative factor
prices. As drawnManufacturesis more capital—intensive than Food, but
this isnotimportant.
The next step is to ask whether a trading economy will reproduce
this integrated economy. Let us measure Home's endowment starting from
0, and Foreiqns endowment starting from 0* Then the division o-f the
world into countries can be represented by a point in the box, such as23
E. If we assume that the varieties of Manufactures arenumerous enough
thatwe can ignore integer constraints, then it is immediately
apparent that trade reproduces the integrated economy as long as the
endowment point lies inside the parallelogram OO*Q'.
Once we have ascertained that the integrated economy'sresource
allocation is reproduced, we can determine the re5ourcallocation
withineach country by completing parallelograms. If the endowmentis
E, Home mustdevoteresources OFm to Manufactures,OFfto Food; the
balance of the integrated economy's production o-Feachqood must be
produced in Foreign. Since there are economies of scal e inproduct ion
ofManufactures, each country willproduce different varieties o-F
manufactured goods; which country produces which varietiesis
indeterminate but also unimportant.
We have now determined the pattern ofproduction; to determine
consumptionaridtrade wenow make use of factor prices. The line WW
hasaslope equalto relativefactorprices, and thus can be seen as a
line along which the shares of Home and Foreign in world incomeare
constant. This means in particular that resources DC receive thesame
share of world income as OE, and thus that OC/OO* is the Home
country's share of world income. Let usnowadd the assumption of
identical spending patterns, and we know that eachcountry wi 11
consume embodied factor services in the same proportion as the world
supplies. It follows that DC is also Home consumption of factor
services, and thus that EC is net trade in factor services As inthe24
ilarshallian case analyzed above, the precise pattern of trade is
indeterminate butthefactor content oftradereflects factor
endowments
We can say more, however. Since DC is Home consumption of factor
services, it must consume 0Cm of these services embodied in
ManufactureSDC-F embodied in Food. This tel is us that Home must be a
netexporter of Manufactures, anet importer of Food.
Al thouqh Home is anetexporterof Manufactures, however, we have
already noted that each country will be producing a different set of
varieties.Since each country isassumed to demand all varieties, this
means that Home will still demand some varieties produced in Foreign.
The result will be a pattern of trade looking like that illustrated in
Figure 6. Home will import Food and be a net exporter of Manufactures,
butit wi 11 also import Manuf actures. so that there wi 11 bentra—
industry" trade.This intra—industry trade isessentially caused by
scale economies; if there were no scale economies, each country would
beable to produceall varietiesof Manufactures itself. Since intra—
industry trade arises from scale economies rather than differences
betweencountries, it does notvanish as countries become more
similar;indeed, it isapparent that if we shift E toward C the volume
ofint.rE;—industry trade will rise both absolutely and relatively to
inter—industry trade. In the limit, if countries have identical
relative factor endowments they will still trade, but all their trade
willbe intra—industry trade based on scale economies.The interestinq point about this analysis of the trade pattern
under monopolistic competition,asithasemerqed from a number a-f
years of clarifyinq analysis., is how little itseemsto depend on the
details.. Ataminor level the differences between alternative
formulations of produc:t differentiation clearly make no difference.
More important, in a broad sense the analysis is essentially thesame
as thatwhichwe have seen emerqes from theassumptionthat economies
of scale are external to firms. The precise pattern a-f trade is
indeterminate, but factor proportions continue to determine trade in
an average sense; scale economies lead to concentration of production
and to a persistence of trade even when countries have identical
factor endowments.As we will arQue in a moment, the analysis of qains
-from trade is also quite similar..
What this suqests is that it is a mistaketo lay too much stress
onthe Chamberlinian assumption per se. Themodels in this literature
make extensive use o-fproductdifferentiation and are often related to
theempirical phenomenon ofintraindustry trade, but the issues
should be seen as broader. Theimportanceof i ncreasinqreturnsin
tradedoes not stand or fall onthe validity o-f particular
interpretationsofproduct differentiation or of two way trade within
statstica1ci assi+icatjons.
B. Applications and ExtensionsOnce we move awayfromthe central issue a-ftradepattern, the
conclusionsa-fthe Chamberlinian approach begin to become a bit more
dependent on particular assumptions. Several areas have, however,
yielded results which either look fairly general or area-f particular
interest. We consider -Four such areas: the gains from trade, trade and
income distribution, intermediateqoods, andtransport costs.
1.Gains from trade
At first sight it might seem that the analysis of gains from
trade in the external economies approach would carry over directly to
the Chamberlinian approach as well. In fact, however, the translation
is not direct, -for two related reasons. First, the relevant scale
variable is not the scale of the industry but the scale a-f production
of individual firrns, and with entry the effects of trade on this scale
are not immediately obvious. Second, trade may lead to extra gains due
to an increase in the variety of products available.
What we can certainly say is that a country will gain from trade
if after trade both the number a-f available varieties and the scale of
production a-f eachvarietyare at least as large asbeforetrade.
Further• ti-ere i s astrongpr-esurnpti onthat the diversity a-f products
will be largerafter trade thanbefore. The problemis one ofpinning
downwhat happensto scale.Here the nature ofproductdifferentiation does make a
difference. What happens to the scale of production depends (for
homathetic production functions ——otherwisestill mare complications
arise) on what happens to the elasticity ofdemandfor individual
varieties.. With Dixit—Stiqlitz preferences, thiselasticityis
constant; trade offers cireater van ety but not cireter scale (Dix it
andNorman1980; Krugman 1980,1981).. With Lancaster preferences, trade
is likely, thouqh not certain, to lead to more elastic demand, forcinq
firms to move further down their averaQe cost curves, so that the
advantacies of a larqer market are reflected both in qreater diversity
and lower averae cost (Helpman 1981).
qain, however, we should not make too much of the details. Eoth
increased scale of production and increased diversity of available
products can be seen as aains from scale, broadly defined. This
insiqht is qiven dmore concrete form by Helpman and Kruqman(1985).
where it is shown that under some assumptions both scale and diversity
will move monotonically with qross industry output. This leads to the
followinq criterion for gains from trade: trade is beneficial if the
world outputa-ftianuf actures is 1 arqer than our national output would
havebeenin the absence of trade.. The similarity to the criterion -For
the external economy case should be obvious.
2. Trade and income distribution28
Wehave arguedfora presumption that scale economies lead to
additional gains from trade above and beyond those resulting from
comparative advantage. This seems to be only a quantitative
difference. However, it can lead to a qualitative difference in the
effects of trade on particular groups within countries. Constant—
returnstrede models predict very strong incame—di stribution effects
from cahnqes in relative prices, so that even though trade is
beneficial iii the aggregate, individuals who draw their income mostly
from factors which are relatively scarce end up worseoff as a result
of trade. Once we add gains from larger scale, however,itseems
possiblethat everyonemay gain from trade.
What makes this art interestingpossibility is that it suggests
that the effectsof trademay depend onitscharacter. If trade is
mostlyHeckscher—Ohlin in motivation —— whichwe would expect if
countries arequit'e different in relative factor endowments and there
areweak economies of scale —— then the conventional result that
scarce factors lose -from trade may be expected to holds If trade is
mostly motivatedbyscale economies —— whichwould happen if countries
aresimilar and scale isimportant, and would be associated with a
prevalenceof I rttra—i ndustry trade —— wemightexpect to find that
ean scarce -factora gain.
This insight sounds fairly general. To demonstrate it in any
r-iqorous way is not easy, however. f(rugman (1981) develops an example
in which there are natural indices of bothsimilarityo-f countriesand29
theimportance ofscaleeconomies, and shows that in fact one can
establish a boundary in terms of these to indices between the case
where scarce factors lose and the case where they gain.. It is possible
to establish as a more qeneral proposition that gains for all factors
are more likely, the more similar a country's endowment is to that of
thewar 1d as a wroieand the sinai 1er theCountry ts; thiss shown iri
I:rugman (1984)
3. Intermediate goods
In several papers Ethier(1979;1982b) has suggested that scale
based international trade is more liI::ely to be important in
intermediate goods than in final goods. He argues force-fully that the
scope for productive differentiation of products and the extent to
which even thewor'd market islikely to be too small to allow
exhaustionc-f scale gains is greatest forhighly specialized
componentscapital goods etc. rather than consumer products.
tJhat difference does this make? The answer is that as long as
trade reproduces the integrated economy, as it does in the models of
Ethier and Helprnan(1785, having trade in intermediate goods rather
than final goods does not make much di -fference at all. The main
difference is one of emphasis: itnow becomes very clear that the
rightscale variable to emphasize when we consider the role of scale
in producing gains -from trace is the size a-F the world industry aftertrade versus the national industry before trade. We have seen that
this is probably the right way to think about the issue even with
consumer goods trade, butherethe point becomes indisputable. The
related nuance is that the doubts which occasionally surface about
whether an increaseinthe diversity 0+ consumer goods really
increases we? -farEseemmuch less reasor,abl e when it asthediversity
of lathes or robots that is at issue.
We may also note a point raised by Helpman and Krugrnan(1985): if
intermediate goods produced with economies of scale are not tradeable,
the result will be to induce the -formati on of industrial complex es,
groups o-f industries tied together by the need to concentrate all
usersof a nontradeable intermediate in the same country.In this case
thepattern of specialization and trade in the Chamberlinian world
will actually come to resemble thepatternin the Marshallian world we
described above.
4.Transport costs
Theexposition of the Chamberlinian approach totrade which we
have presented is based heavily onthe assumpti on that trade
reproducesthe integrated economy, with zero transport costs a key
element in this assumption. For some purposes this is clearly an
annoying limitation. No general integration o-ftransport costs into
the Chamberlinian trade model has been achieved, but some work has
been done on special cases with interesting results.31
One way to allow for transport costs with a minimum of complexity
is to assume that these costs are either zero or prohibitive, so that
we get a strict division of industries into tradeables and
nontradeables.If we then assume that there are enough tradeable
sectors and that countries are sufficiently similar in their factor
endowments. we can still have factor price equalization. In this case,
however, factor price equalization need not mean that the integrated
economy is reproduced; if differentiated products are included .n the
setof nontradedgoods, the fragmentation of the world economy reduces
thescale at which these products are produced and the number of
varieties available to consumers.
This is a useful observation in itself; it becomes especially
interesting when we combine it with some considerationof factor
mobility. Forifthere are nontraded goods produced with increasing
returns,this provides an incentive for migration to large economies,
a process which will in turn reinforce these economies' size
advantage. This point was noted by Helpman and Razin(1980) and
elaborated on in Heipman and Kruqman (19B5> ,whereit is also noted
that the incentive isactuallyfor a change in the location of
consumption,not production.
Themore realistic case where transport costs matter but are not
prohibitiveis much harder to analyze, except under very specific
assumptions about tastes and tehrology.Pi veryspecial model is
consideredby Krugman(1980)and elaborated on by Venables(1965).Thismodel generates a result which on reflection looks as though it ought
to be more general than the particularity of the assumptions might
lead one to believe. The result is this: Other things equal, countries
will tend to be net exporters o-f goods for which they have relatively
large domestic markets.
heloqic of this result is quite simple. Suppose that there is a
product which is said to two locations, and can be produced in either
one at equal cost. Suppose further that there are transport costs
betweenthe two locations, but that economies of scale arestrong
enoughto assure that nonetheless the product willbe producedin only
one place.Then the location of production will be chosen to minimize
transport costs, and this clearly means producing in the location with
the larger market and exporting to the smaller market
C. MultinationalsandTade i n Tech n ol
In addition to allowing a very concise treatment of the role of
economies a-f scale in international trade, the Chamberlinian approach
has proved usefulasa way of organizing thinking about two related
issueswhichdo not -fit at all well into perfect—competition trade
models. These are therolea-f trade in technology, on one side, and of
multinational firms, on the other.
Thereason whytrade in technology cannot betreatedin
conventionalmodels is that investment in knowledge is hardtomodelexcept as a kind of fixed cost, which inevitably leads toa breakdown
of perfect competition. OncewehaveaChamberlinian setup, however,
the issue is straiqhtforward One simply has firms inone country
devei op products,then sell the kruowl edge ofhow to produce these
productsto firms in another country, who set thmseivesu as
rionopoli sti competi tor. A model along these lines wasdeveloped by
Feenstra and Judd (198?); their analysis makesclearly the point that
trade irz technolocy need riot be much different inits effects from any
tradein which fixed costs play a siqnificnt role.
Anatural extension 0-F this analysis is to imaginethat for some
reason licensing or sale of technology is notpossible, so that
technology can only be transferred within firms. In thiscase the
modelof technology transfer can then bereinterpreted as oneof
multinationalfirms. A simple model of this type is set forth in
k:ruqman(1980)like the Feenstra—Judd analysis, itsuggests that
multinationalenterprise is more likpordinarytrade thanonemight
havesupposed.
Th identification ofdirect foreign investment with technology
transferi s too narrow, however. A moreaeneral approach was suggested
byHelman(i9g4;i and in turn simplified and generalized inHelpman and
Kruqman(1985).This approach essentially argues that multinational
enterprise occurs. whenever there exist related activities for which
thefoil owing is true there are si mul taneous!y transacti on cost
incentives to integrate these activities withina single -Firm arid34
factor cost or other incentives to separate the activities
qeographically. Suppose, for example, that there is a two—stage
production process consisting of a capital—intensive upstreamactivity
anda labor—iritensi ye downstreamactivity,and that for any of the
usualreasonsthere are compellinq reasonsto combine these activities
inside vertically i ntc'qratod firms. Suppose a! so tnat countries are
sufficientlydifferent in factor endowments that unless these
activities are eoaraphically separated there will be unequal -factor
prices. Then the result will clearly be the emergence of firmswhich
extendacross national boundaries.
Themain contributiono-f thenew literature on multinational
enterprise hasprobablybeen to clear away someconfusions about what
multinationalsdo. What the new models make clear, above all , isthat
multinational enterprise isriota type o-f factormobility.It
representsan extensionofcontrol, riot necessarilyamovement o-f
capital. The key lesson is that direct foreign investment isn't
investment
D. Summ ay
When it was first introduced, the Chamberlirian approach to the
analysis of trade represented abreakthrough.Forthefirst time it
became pcssi bl eto di scus trade ssues I nvolvi na scale ecctnomi esand
Imperfect conpetiton nteliiibly. t the same time, however, it was35
difficultto assess how general were the insicihts gained from thevery
special models first presented.
Subsequent work has removed some of this uncertainty. Many of the
conclusions of the monopolistic competition approach have proved to be
independent of the details of the specificatior. In fact, as we have
sugqestedin a broad sense many of the insightscarry overto other
narket structures as well. This realization in away devalues the
Chamberlinian approach ——itshould now be seen as one of several
usefulanalyticaldevices rather than as the alternative to constant—
returns trade theory. But the simplicity andclarity of monopolistic
competition models of trade insures that they will remaina valuable
part o-fthetoolbox for a long time.
III. TheCournDt pproach
Our-first two approaches to trade under conditions ofincreasing
returnsmay be viewed as being driven by the desire to focus on
decreasingcosts as a motive for trade while avoiding as muchas
possi ble getting bogged down in issues of market structure. The
Marshallian approach preserves perfect competitiondespite the
presence of scale conomi es by assuminq that these economies are wholly
external. The Chamberlinjan approach abandonsperfect competition but3e
turnsinstead to the opposite pole of a world of little monopolists,
avoiding the awkward middle ground of oligopoly. As a research
strateqy, this artful theoretical dodging is wholly defensible,
especiallygiven our continuinglack of anything like a general theory
o-fcompetition amorici small numbersoffirms. Yetwe cannotcompletely
ignore the oliqopoly isSLIE especially if we suspect that the
interactionof imperfect competition with trade may give rise to
important effects missed by these approaches.
There is no general analysis of oligopoly; butevena special
analysis is better than none. Some important insights into
international trade have been gained by adopting the admittedly
unsatisfactory Cournot assumption that imperfectly competitive firms
take each others outputs as given. Much of the usefulness of this
approach has come in the analysis of trade policy, discussed in the
paper by Dixit; but two themes deserve discussion in this paper. The
first of these is the roleof tradein reducing monopoly power and
increasing competition. The second isthepossibility that market
segmentationand price discrimination canserve as a cause of
seeminglypointless trade.
A. Trade and Market Power
Suppose that there is some i ridustry which ineach oftwo
countries contains only a -few firms. Supposealsothat thesefirms37
competein a Cournot fashion, so that in equilibrium price will be
above marginal cost, by a markupwhichdepends on the perceived
elaticity of per—firm demand. Finally, suppose that in the absence of
tradein this industry the price o-ftheqood itproduceswould be the
same in both countries.
Underperfect competition,allowing trade intriisindustry would
haveno effect. With Cournot competition, however, this isno longer
the case. Iftradeis opened, each -firm will become part ofa larqer
more competitive market. It will see itself as facinga higher
elasticityof demand, leading it to expand output.Thus industry
output willexpand, and theprice will fall. If the countries are
,as
described, symmetric, welfare will rise in both due to thereduction
inthemonopoly distortion. Interestingly, this effect need not be
associatedwithany actual trade in either direction. It is potential
foreigntrade, whichchangesthe slope ofthe demand curve rather
than the actualtrade flowswhichexertsthe pro—competitive e-ffect.
The possibility o-f gains from trade due to increasedcometitio,-,
has been understood -for a long time. It wasemphasized in particular
by Caves(.1974). Early analyses usually assumed however that themove
was frompure monopolytoperfect competition; onlywiththe work of
Dix it ard Norman ' 1980) was the more reaonable caseofamovementfrom
more to less imperfect competition considered, at leastformally.
Whyshould there be only a limited number of -firms in the
I ndustr'T The cbvi OLkS answeris the presence of some form o-feconomies38
ofscale internal to firms. Once we allow for this, however, it
becomes an obvious possibility that the increase in competition dueto
trade may leave firms unable to charqe a markup on rnarqinal cost
su+ficiefltto cover their averagecost. The result will be exit. Dixit
andNorman de\'eI op a simple example in which they show that the effect
ofopeni nq trade ir a Courriot market is to lead to a world industry
whichhas fewer, larqer firms thanthesum of national industries
before trade., but in which competition is nonetheless increased. Thus
the opening leads not only to a reduction in the monopoly distortion
but also to an increase in productive efficiency. Once aqain, it is
the potential for trade rather than thetradeflows themselves which
do the qood work.
Thepro—competitive effect of trade is not exactly a scale
economy story. It qoes naturally with such a story however, precisely
because decreasinq costs are themostnatural explanation o-fimperfect
competition.
B. Market SmentaUonandPrice Discrimination
At the be1nn1nQ of this paper we suqQested that trade can always
be explained as beinq due to the combined effects o-ftwo motives for
specialization, differences between countries and economies o+ scale.
Remarkably, the Cournot approach has actually led to the discovery of
a third possible e>planatior for trade —— although arguably not of39
equalimportance in practice. This is the possibility that trade may
arise purely because imperfectly competitive firms have an incentive
to try to gain incremental sales by "dumping" in each others' home
markets.
Theseminal paper is by 13r ander (1980). The model envi saqes an
industryconsistinq o-ftwo firms, each ina different country. These
firsare assumed tobe abletochoose separately their deliveries to
each national market, and to take the other firm's deliveries to each
market as given. Suppose that initially there were no trade in this
industry. Theneach firmwould act as a monopolist, restricting
deleveries to the market to sustain the price. There would then
however be an incentive for each firm to sell a little bit in the
other'shome market as long asthepricethere exceeds the marginal
cost, This process will continue until, with symmetric firms, each
firm has a fifty percent share of each market.
If the markets are separated by transport costs, the outcome will
notbe so extreme. Nonetheless, it is shown in Brander and
Krugman(1983) that even with transport costs there may be across—
hauling": two—way trade in thesameproduct. What sustains this trade
fact that each firm sees itself as facing a higher elasticity
of demand on its exports than it does on domestic sales because it
has a smaller share o-f the foreign than the domestic market. This
means that the -Firm is wiilinQ to sell abroad at a smaller markup over
marginal cost than at home, rnakinq it willing to absorb the transport40
coston foreign sales. Indeed, it is this difference in perceived
demand elasticity which drives the determination o-fthevolume of
trade: the equilibrium market share of imports is precisely that which
makesexportersjustillinqto absorb transport costs.
Thistheory of seemingly pointlesstrade, which is described in
Eranderand F:ruqmar as "reciprocal dumpi nq1', is rd ated 1riimportant
ways to the traditional industrial organization literature on basing
point pricing arid cross—hauling (Smithies 1942).What the newmodels
make clear, however, is that despite the waste involvedin
transporting the samegood in two directions trade can still be
beneficial. qainst pointless transport costs must beset the increase
incompetition. Indeed, i-f thereis free entry and exit o-ffirms, it
can be shown that the oains from '1rationalizing" the industry and
increasing the scale o-f production alwaysoutweigh the wastein
transport.
C.Summary
Theaplicatiori o-f Cournot—type models to trade theory leads to
new and important insights about international trade. Papers using the
Cournot approach have had a fundamentally di-f-ferent orientation from
thoseusing the Marshallian or Chamberlinian approaches. Instead of
focussing on economies of scale arid treating market structure as a
supporting player as best, this literature has treated imperfect41
competition as the prataqonist and used economies of scale mostly as
an explanation of the existence a-f oliqopoly.
The payoff -from this shift in emphasis is substantial.new
source a-f potential qains from trade is identified ——namely,the
e-ffectof trade in increasirq competition (andq if it induces exit, in
"rationaiizirtq production). MorE' surprisinqly, a new cue of trade
is also identified: interpenetration of markets because oliqapalists
perceive a hiciher elasticity of demand on exports than on domestic
sales.
The major importance oftheCournot approach however, lies
outside the scope of this paper. This is its versatility and
flexibility for the discussion o-f trade policy. The models we have
described under the headinqs of Marshallian and Chamberlinian
approaches mostly depend on the assumption that trade reproduces an
inteqrated economy as a way to make the analysis tractable. Tariffs,
quotas, subsidies inevitably break this perfect inteqration, renderin
these models unsuitable. The Cournot approach, however, does not have
this problem, and has id to a rapidly qrowinq literature on trade and
industrial policy under imperfect competition.
IV. Conclusions
A. What we have learned42
Intellectualprogress is often hardtoperceive. Once new ideas
have become absorbed, they can seem obvious and one begins to believe
thatone always understood them. Theideas that trade canbecaused by
increasingreturns, and that increased scale is a source o-f gains -from
trade, are sufficientlysimple that the memory o-fhow little these
ideas were appreciated even -five yearsagois •fadinq fast. Thus itis
probably worth restating what we have learned.
few years ago it is probably fair to say that when
international economists thought about the role of increasing returns
in trade at all, they implicitly thought in terms of a 2x2 model in
which one sector is subject to external economies. In this approach
scale economies appear as a modification or distortion of comparative
advantage, rather than an independent source of trade. The effect of
increasingreturns is to make it ii kely,other things equal that
large countries will export goods subject to scaleeconomies. One can
findmany writings in which the view is taken that this effect is the
on1 possible role of increasing returns in international trade.
What we have now moved to is a -far more satisfactory view in
which increasingreturnsare -fully i ritegrated into th trade model
rather than grafted on to the Heckscher—Ohlin model as ar
a-fterthought. The new approaches allow us to understand clearly that
decreasing costs are ar i ndeendent source c-f both trade and gal ns
-from trade,ar:d to have a clear visiono-f a trading world in which43
both increasing returns and differences in factor endowments drive the
pattern of specialization and trade.
This shift in view was initially larqely brouciht about by the
introduction of new models of imperfect competition into trade theory.
With some perspective, however, we cannowsee that the details o-F
thesemodels are less important than miht have appeared at first.
What is really crucial for the new view of trade is not so much the
particular model of market structure but a chanqe in modelling
strateqy. The key breakthrough has been a willinqness to ask different
questions, and be satisfied with a somewhat different answer than we
were used to.
Traditionally, trade models have qiven us a precise description
of the pattern of trade in goods. In models where there are important
increasing returns, however, a characteristic feature is the existence
of multiple equilibria. What we have learned to do is essentially to
learn to live with multiple equilibria, by focussing on models where a
good deal can be said without requiring that we know the precise
pattern o-F specialization and trade. By concentrating on resource
allocation rather than goods production; by looking at trade in
embodied factor services rather than in the precise goods in which
these factor services are embodied; by noting that it may be more
important to be able to show that production will be concentrated
somewhere than to say where it will be concentrated, we are able to
bypass the complexities that led trade theory to avoid discussion of
increasingreturns for many years.44
Toanswer a question by changing it is not something to
everyone'staste. The payoff here has, however, been remarkable: by
vhat inretrospect seems a minor shift in emphasis,we have cireatly
enlarcied the ranqe ofphenomena which our theory can encompass.
B. What needs to bedone
The theory of trade under increasing returns is not a finished
product.Much work still needs to be done especially in three areas.
These are the following:
(1) Dynamic models: In the real worlds many ofthe advantages of
larqe scaleprobably take the form of dynamic economies, whether in
theform oflearning effects or fixed—cost--like R&D. Theproblem is
thatdynamic competition in oligapolistic markets may be quite
different in character from what static models would suggest, and
needs to be studied.
(ii) More realistic models o-f competition: Not much need be said
here. The external economy approach is clearly unrealistic in assuming
perfect competition; theChamberlinian approach relies on
funcamental 1 y peculiar cross—restrictions an technology anduti1 i ty;
the Cournot approach is surely far too crude.
(iii) The unreproduced integratedeconomy: ssuming that trade
reproducesthe inteqrated economy does wondersin simplifying the
analysis Now we need to edge our way back intoa consi derati on of45
whathappens when it does not, especially because of trade barriers
and transport costs.
Thesetheoretical extensions areimportant and needed. What we
ricedeven more, however, is tono from qualitative theory to numerical
applications. 'This hasalways been difficultin international trade.
'Thenew work on tracie makes it even harder because once we are no
lonqer assum].nq perfect competition and constant returns we need -far
mare in-formation to model behavior. In fact, we probably need a whole
new methodoloqy -for empirical work, possibly mixinq casestudy
evidenceand even interview results with econometrics and simulation
techniques. Still, now that we have an eleQant theory, this is the
obvious next step.
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